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Tomatoes, land and hearsay:
property and history in Asante in the time of structural adjustment
Sara Berry
As debate over African economic problems and prospects has shifted from concern with the
continent's "agricultural crisis" in the 1980s, to a focus on environmental degradation and sustainable
development in the 1990s, the policy wheel has come full circle. In the 1980s, a number of donor
agencies and governments argued in the 1980s that African economies* rising foreign debts and chronic
budgetary deficits were fuelled in large part by stagnating or declining levels of agricultural production,
brought on by African governments' poor choice of policies and excessive intervention in domestic
markets and production.1 To reduce their debts and regenerate agricultural production for domestic
markets and for export, African governments were advised to adopt structural adjustment packages
designed to reduce or eliminate controls on prices, trade and output, cut government spending, and
transfer assets and productive activities from the public to the private sector.2 By the end of the decade,
as many economies began to show signs of agricultural recovery (arguably due as much to better weather
and long-term urban growth as to policy-induced shifts in relative prices)3 and greater macroeconomic
stability in the short-term, policymakers' attention shifted to the question of how to promote sustained and
equitable economic growth in the long run.4 Focussing particularly on the problem of environmental
degradation, some analysts have begun to call for increased regulation of Africans* economic activities,
from hunting, herding, and farming, to commercial logging, mining and manufacturing. One recent
study, sponsored by the World Bank, proposes "an action plan" of incentive schemes to "create demand"
for smaller families and improved agricultural technology-backed up by controls to "eliminat[e] open-
access land tenure conditions" and induce "policy-created artificial scarcity of farmland,.." Others have
advocated fences, armed guards and/or closely monitored "buffer zones" to prevent exploitation of
protected areas and species.5 Having argued in the 1980s for getting the state out of many areas of
economic activity in Africa, donor agencies now apparently want to bring it back in.
Calls for renewed intervention raise questions about state capacity, and link the issue of
sustainable development to another set of policy debates-namely those concerning prospects for
democracy in Africa. Reporting on Africa's economic situation in the mid-1990s, the World Bank took
hopeful note of recent'signs of "political liberalization"—a rather open-ended term which refers, broadly,
to the reduction or relaxation of state control over political organization and debate—and the emergence of
a "rich and vibrant associational life...independent of the state...."6 The authors express cautious
optimism that "the political transition which is taking place in Africa... forms a backdrop [for economic
progress], and... may even interact significantly with the development agenda,"7 but add that further state
and institutional "capacity building" will be needed. They decline, however, to offer detailed prescriptions
for institutional reform, beyond appeal for "reconciliation" between formal and informal institutions,8 and
exhorting African governments "to move farther and faster" in privatizing publicly owned assets and
enterprises.9
While the Bank and other donors have shifted their stance more than once on what roles African
states and institutions ought to play in economic development, policy debates have also been marked by
underlying continuities in analytical strategies and assumptions about African capacities for economic
and political development. Despite recent appeals for flexibility, in policies and institutional capacity,10
much of this discussion rests on reified, a-historical approaches to thinking about African institutions and
their role in economic and political transformations. After discussing some of the conceptual
inflexibilities which underlie recent arguments both for and against increasing the role of states and local
institutions in resource allocation and management, this essay discusses the possibility of developing a
more processual approach which takes account of existing flexibility, diversity and ambiguity in African
institutions, and draws on a case study of land rights and agricultural practices in a rural community in
Ghana to illustrate the argument.
Re-thinking institutions
In 1983, the Ghanaian economy was in serious crisis. After more than a decade of declining
exports, deteriorating infrastructure, and spiralling inflation, Ghana was poorly prepared to cope with the
severe drought which affected much of West Africa in 1983-4. The crisis was further compounded when
Nigeria suddenly expelled undocumented aliens from the country, forcing over a million Ghanaians, many
of whom had migrated to Nigeria to escape deteriorating economic conditions at home, to return to an
economy already devastated by drought and depression. Domestic food supplies fell sharply, and many
imported goods virtually disappeared from markets and shops. In exchange for financial assistance, the
Ghanaian government embarked on a program of economic liberalization, under the guidance of the
World Bank and other donors. Price and exchange controls were eliminated or greatly reduced;
government harrassment of private traders abated;11 state marketing agencies were gradually disbanded or
"downsized"; and tens of thousands of government employees were laid off.12 In addition, some state
agencies were reorganized along private lines. In the early 1990s, Cocobod, the cocoa marketing board,
relinquished its official monopoly over the cocoa export trade, and began to compete directly with private
firms. Credit for smallholder fanners was expanded both through the Agricultural Development Bank,
and the Rural Banks—private banks organized within rural communities to mobilize savings for rural
development, but supervised by the Bank of Ghana.13 And studies were commissioned to investigate the
feasibility of privatizing property rights through a formal program of land registration and titling.14
Aggregate economic indicators suggest that the overall performance of the Ghanaian economy
improved markedly in the late 1980s and early '90s, and the country has often been cited as an example of
the success of structural adjustment programs.15 Between 1984 and 1989, foreign aid and imports
doubled, bringing back a wide range of consumer goods which had all but disappeared from Ghanaian
shops and markets.16 Exports also grew significantly, but remained relatively undiversified: in 1993,
cocoa, timber and gold accounted for 80% of the value of Ghana's merchandise exports.17 Total
agricultural production grew modestly at an annual rate of two percent, from 1987 to 1991. While
production and trade generally increased, consumption remained heavily oriented towards imports. In the
1990s, real incomes have been steadily eroded by the falling value of the cedi, and only those at the upper
levels of the income scale have enjoyed rising standards of living. For a large number of Ghanaians,
including many of the nation's farmers, the gains from a decade of structural adjustment have been
painfully small.
The mixed record of economic performance since the mid-1980s has been accompanied by
considerable debate over its causes. In 1995, a World Bank report argued that structural adjustment
policies had succeeded in stabilizing many economies in Africa, but had yet to launch them onto a path of
sustained economic growth. The authors added that top-down programs of privatization mandated under
structural adjustment were reinforced, in Ghana and other African countries, by spontaneous changes in
local social practices and in political consciousness. In particular, they cite two kinds of evidence to
support this view: (1) the "evolution" by local communities of increasingly individualized rights to land
and other forms of property, under pressure from population growth and commercialization;18 and (2) the
emergence of a newly energized "civil society" whose constituent groups articulate popular demands for
less government and more accountability.
The Bank's report suggests that such developments point to changes in the way power is brought
to bear on resource access, resource allocation, and the distribution of wealth, which may bring greater
transparency and accountability to African governance in the long run. But there is little agreement
among policymakers or scholars as to why this is happening or what it implies for sustainable
development and democratization. On the national level, some credit civil society with helping to bring
about political as well as economic liberalization by initiating or supporting demands for privatization and
the rule of law,19 while others point to the incompleteness or outright failure of many democratic
transitions as evidence that civil society has been relatively ineffectual.20 On the local level, some
maintain that spontaneous transformations in, e.g., rural property rights obviate the need for state-
mandated privatization, while others continue to advocate formal land registration and titling.21
Disagreements over the political strength and effectiveness of "civil society" are paralleled by debates over
the capacity of communities and other local institutions to manage resources under conditions of rapid
economic, political and demographic change.
While observers disagree as to whether African states and local institutions are moving in the
direction of democracy and sustainable development, many share a common set of assumptions about their
underlying character. Postcolonial states in Africa are often described as "neopatrimoniaT—a term first
coined by Aristide Zolberg to help account for the swift demise of the parliamentary-style governments
which took power immediately after independence. In a recent article, Bratton and van der Walle explain
succinctly that in neopatrimonial regimes "the right to rule is ascribed to a person rather than an office,"
and officials govern through the award of personal favors rather than the rule of law.22 Personal
relationships and patronage "constitute the foundation and superstructure of political institutions...from
the highest reaches of the presidential palace to the humblest village assembly"23 and determine, to a large
extent, the way African governments respond both to political opposition and to economic change.
Adding that neopatrimonial rule "corresponds to the normal forms of social organization in precolonial
societies,"24 they suggest that "contemporary political changes are conditioned by mechanisms of rule
embedded in the ancien regime."25 In other words, neopatrimonialism is deeply entrenched in
contemporary African politics because it is traditional.
Similar arguments inform much recent discussion of local institutions* capacities for resource
management and political participation. Even optimistic assessments of the transformative potential of
Africa's "rich associational life" often rest on typologies of coping strategies or institutional parameters
rather than dynamic analysis of social interactions. In detailing the "anatomy" of Ghanaian politics and
civil society, for example, Chazan offered vivid descriptions of the strategies with which ordinary
Ghanaians struggled against economic decline in the 1970s and early 80s, but said little about how such
behavioral "syndromes" give rise to social or political transformation.26 More recently, Widner explained
Ivoirian farmers' "discovery of'politics"' during the cocoa crisis of 1987-90 in terms of the presence or
absence of various structural traits in "participant" and "non-participant" villages.27
Chazan's and Widner's attention to the energy and resilience with which African men and
women have confronted political and economic upheavals is, of course, a far cry from the sweeping
dismissiveness of authors such as Cleaver and Schreiber, who recently attributed environmental
degradation to the "persistence of traditional arrangements and practices," the "breakdown"of
"traditional land tenure systems [and] tenure security," and the inability of African "institutions and
individuals [to] adapt quickly enough in the face of very rapid population growth."28 Yet both
approaches tend to cast African communities and institutions as stable entities, whose ability (or inability)
to cope with externally introduced change is rooted in time-honored habits of resource management and
conflict resolution. Like prognostications of the imminent "breakdown" of "traditional institutions"
unable to imagine a changing world, optimistic assessments of Africans' collective ability to manage
resources or bring about progressive political change through grassroots action often project images of
African societies which are not very different from the "closed, corporate, consensual communities"
imagined by colonial administrators, and some of the anthropologists who worked for them.29
Reified, a-historical depictions of states and local institutions in Africa have been reinforced,
ironically, by "new institutionalists" who disavow structuralist explanations social behavior, in favor of
rational choice. By treating social processes as aggregates of individual behavior, new institutionalists
often imply that groups in civil society act collectively, whether or not they are formally organized, in
single-minded pursuit of shared goals. Thus, civil society's goals are sometimes inferred from its
members' occupations (law, business, teaching, journalism) or institutional affiliations (churches, traders'
associations, ethnic unions) rather than determined through direct empirical investigation~in a manner
reminiscent of marxist concepts of classes, or class fractions, "in" and "for" themselves. Even when
efforts are made to observe what elements of civil society are up to, it is often deemed sufficient to conduct
opinion surveys,30 document the ideas and activities of one or two leaders,31 or treat institutions as sets of
rules, without problematizing the social group(s) who recognize them.32 Similarly, those who advocate
giving local communities a greater role in managing their own resources often treat "the community" as a
monolithic entity, whose capacity for effective management is presumed to derive from long established
rules of mutual trust and cooperation, enhanced by the low levels of transactions costs and information
asymmetries said to prevail in local settings and "customary" institutions.33 It is but a short conceptual
step to the opposite conclusion—that traditional institutions are "breaking down" under the pressure of
accelerated change, and must be rebuilt or coerced into altering their ways.
Such arguments are fundamentally at odds with a growing body of work by historians and
anthropologists which documents the complexity and variety of historical processes in Africa, and
questions the usefulness of evolutionary, as well as functionalist paradigms, for understanding them.
Pointing to millenia of migration, adaptation, and cultural interaction among African peoples, as well as
trade and contact between Africa and other parts of the world, many of these scholars have argued that it
is more realistic to try to understand African social relationships and institutions in processual rather than
in structuralist terms.34 It is now widely recognized, for example, that the "customary" rules and
practices cited in contemporary disputes over land are of relatively recent historical provenance, many of
them "invented" or significantly redefined to serve the needs of colonial administrators.35 Similarly, a
growing number of scholars have questioned the paradigm which represents African societies as
"responding" en bloc to "exogenous shocks." In Africa, as in other parts of the world, changes in climate,
population density, economic conditions or patterns of conquest and domination have often led people to
question established practices, experiment with new ideas, and contest or renegotiate rules and boundaries
which they find inadequate or unacceptable in new circumstances. In the process, social identities and
institutions have multiplied and/or been reshaped so often that they appear to take on permanent qualities
of fluidity, ambiguity and creativity.36
Thinking about institutions as processes begins with movement and interaction. For example,
one might conceptualize social institutions, such as household, family, community, etc., not as clearly
bounded, consensual social entities, but rather as constellations of social interactions, in which people
move, acquire and exchange ideas and resources, and negotiate or contest the terms of production,
authority and obligation. People interact, within and across various social boundaries, in multiple ways
and relations among them are constituted less through the uniform application of written or unwritten
rules, as through multiple processes of negotiation and contest which may occur simultaneously, or in
close succession, but need not be synchronized or even mutually consistent. Over the course of the
twentieth century, for example, farmers in many parts of Africa sought access to the means of production
through their membership in social networks, but the terms on which they did so changed in a variety of
ways. Access to both land and labor was frequently mobilized through social networks but, in some areas,
fanners' access to land remained more closely linked to their ties with relatives, neighbors and local
authorities than did their access to labor.37 Thus, changes in conditions of access to land and to labor
followed different trajectories over time, and their impact on crop patterns, methods of cultivation, uses of
agricultural income, and the distribution of assets and income varied from one locality to another,
according to differences in the way land and labor were combined in processes of agricultural production,
as well as variations in local market conditions, off-farm employment opportunities, and debates over
authority, obligation, and the division of labor and output.
Such a approach implies that membership in social institutions creates opportunities for people to
engage in negotiation and/or struggle, rather than guaranteeing outcomes (subsistence, identity, etc.) or
necessarily defining stable, consistent social relationships. It might be objected that this simply re-
invents an old wheel: that, for example, economists have long understood markets as arenas of exchange
which occupy no fixed territorial boundaries or institutional structures, and may not even be seen by their
participants as fields of shared interest. Instead, a market is constituted by multiple, simultaneous (or
successive) acts of participation in a particular form of exchange, its boundaries revealed (like consumer
preferences) through practice. The difference lies, I think, in the objectives of the analysis. Economic
theory analyzes market performance in terms of equilibria: economists are more interested in identifying
conditions under which a given set of transactions will reach equilibrium than in the processes of
negotiation, conflict, compromise, etc., through which transactions themselves are effected and their terms
and conditions changed. Market theory is grounded, of course, in methodological individualism and
eschews structuralist terminology, but the emphasis on equilibria gives rise nonetheless to a kind of
structuralist thinking about social aggregates. Defined in purely voluntarist terms, market boundaries are
(and can be) treated as conceptually unambiguous because they are not described. If we attempt an
empirically informed description, we are forced to confront the fact that different participants (and
observers) may see the market, or any other social institution, differently and that its boundaries, structure,
and socio-historical significance are therefore subject to both ambiguity and debate.
What is needed, in other words, is attention to the processes of negotiation and debate through
which institutions themselves are constituted and people conduct their affairs within and among them. In
the following pages, I will argue not only that institutional boundaries and structures are negotiated and
contested, but also that negotiations themselves are on-going processes (rather than sets of equilibrium
conditions) whose significance for social relationships lies, inter alia, in the fact that they don't end. In
several recent essays which re-visit the idea that wealth-in-people has long been central to processes of
accumulation and socio-economic change in Africa, Guyer suggests that in many parts of Equatorial
Africa, people are valued for their singularity and creativity as much as (or more than) for their
(undifferentiated) labor or capacities for reproductioa Throughout the region, she argues, multiplicity
and singularity have figured centrally in material life, social adaptation and modes of thought "As
Laburthe-Tolra writes: 'The Beti of the past enjoyed to the highest degree a genius for multiplicity and
variety. "Mekyae, mekyae": there are all sorts of lineages, all sorts of marriages, all sorts of chiefs and
slaves, all sorts of rituals and dances, all sorts of hunting and trapping, of machetes or cooking
spoons....1"38 If African societies and cultures have exhibited great diversity and fluidity over time, as
much recent scholarship suggests, it is appropriate to shift our analytical focus from structures to
processes, from rules and outcomes to on-going negotiation and debate.
Understanding institutions in terms of processes, rather than outcomes, of debate and negotiation
is, of course, closely related to the analysis of discourse which has been a central theme of post-
Foucaultian debates over culture, power and history, in Africa and elsewhere. Scholars working in this
paradigm have done a great deal to elucidate the workings of hegemony—the exercise of power without
coercion~in particular by showing how discourse can exclude events or categories of people, acts, or ideas
from discussion or even from imagination. Trouillot argued recently that, because plantation owners in
Haiti and their compatriots in France believed that "enslaved Africans and their descendants could not
envision freedom," they could not envision the possibility of a slave uprising. "The Haitian Revolution
thus entered history with the peculiar characteristic of being unthinkable even as it happened."39 But
discursive hegemonies are rarely absolute. The kinds of debates one hears in Ghanaian courtrooms and
courtyards, for example-over institutional and territorial boundaries, rights to property and relations of
power-are as noteworthy for their openendedness and lack of finality as for their power to limit or
conclude. To be sure, people do not participate in such debates on equal terms, nor does the fact of debate
guarantee anyone access to wealth, power, or even subsistence. It does, however, affect the way people
spend time, use resources, and think about their problems and possibilities.
If one thinks of institutions as flexible constellations of activities, in (and among) which people
move, negotiate, and exchange things and ideas, there is no reason to assume that institutions (or their
members) will act in coordinated or even consistent ways, or that moving people, resources or activities
from one institutional arena to another will necessarily change the way they think, act, are used, or
happen. Sudden relocations or redefinitions of institutional rules and practices may intensify debate and
struggle over the boundaries between them—just as colonial or national boundaries in Africa have
sometimes given rise to new kinds of cross-border economic activity, community organization and social
identity."0 Institutions do play significant roles in processes of social change, but often as objects rather
than parameters of struggle and manoeuvre. To grasp their historical significance, we have to ask who is
debating, crossing and/or protecting their boundaries, and how? Before we can understand whether
"privatization" and "political liberalization" are likely to promote economic development, we need to ask
what those processes consist of, and what they mean, in theory and in practice, to the people who are
engaged in carrying them forward.
Kumawu
In June and July, 1994,1 lived in Kumawu, a rural town about 50 km northeast of Kumase, the
regional capital of Asante. Kumawu is located on the edge of the ecological "transitional11 zone between
the forests which cover much of southern and central Asante, and the open savannahs of the Aflram
Plains. According to the last published Ghanaian census, its population in 1983 was 8,409. Any census
count of a community like Kumawu is of course somewhat arbitrary since, at any given moment, many
people who consider themselves Kumawufo... (people of Kumawu) may be farming, trading, working,
visiting, worshipping or politicking in other places. Many residents of Kumawu farm, but they also
engage in many other kinds of income-earning activities, depending on opportunity, skill and
wherewithal. Many children attend school (there are several primary and junior secondary schools in the
town, plus Tweneboa Kodia Senior Secondary School which draws students from other communities as
well as from Kumawu), but the streets, compounds, and surrounding fields are never empty of children
(many wearing uniforms) even during school hours.
Kumawu is relatively well served by the taxis and trotros (passenger vans) which constitute the
backbone of Ghana's transportation system: a trip to Kumase takes about an hour and a quarter, and one
rarely has to wait more than half an hour for a vehicle. Many people who live in Kumawu commute to
Kumase on a daily basis to work and/or trade. Most Kumawufo... have many relatives who also reside in
the town-and many others who live and work in the cocoa fanning areas of Central and Western Ghana,
the Afrram Plains, Kumase, Accra, Northern Ghana, Togo, Cote d'lvoire, Germany or Canada. The
town's wealthiest entrepreneur has built two mansions which overlook Kumawu from the southern
escarpment, but he has lived in Accra for fifty years and spends only an occasional weekend in Kumawu.
The Ohemaa (Queenmother), whose judicial, ceremonial and political responsibilities in the town are
considerable, commutes from Toronto to fulfill them.
Tomatoes
In Kumawu, the bush fires of 1983 destroyed not only standing forest cover, but also many cocoa
farms. In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, farmers (including refugees from Nigeria and the non-
agricultural sectors of Ghana's decimated economy) concentrated on growing staple foodstuffs—principally
maize, cassava and cocoyam- for home consumption and for sale, together with small amounts of
vegetables to supplement their household diets.41 As the economy recovered, farmers began to experiment
with growing larger amounts of vegetables for the market. By the end of the decade, tomatoes had
become Kumawu's most conspicuous commercial crop.*12
In 1994, most tomatoes in Kumawu were grown on fields of one hectare or less, often in
combination with other crops."3 Most of the farmers whom I interviewed cultivated more than one plot of
land, but few had more than one field under tomatoes at any given time. It was, however, common to
plant tomatoes two or three times during the year, and a few farmers had as many as four fields under
tomatoes at once. A field might be used for two or three consecutive crops of tomatoes, but would then be
rotated to other crops or left fallow, and the farmer would seek another field if s/he wanted to plant
tomatoes again. The principal reason for the small scale of most tomato cultivation appeared to be
financial. Tomato cultivation in Kumawu is highly commercialized. Fanners reported spending
anywhere from $45 to $80 or more per acre on fertilizers and pesticides for each crop of tomatoes. Most
farmers employed laborers, at $1.20-51.50 for half a day's work, for field preparation and harvesting,
which included headioading crates of freshly picked tomatoes to the nearest motorable road, and many
also used hired laborer to help with planting, weeding and spraying. (Some farmers also paid rent to use
land for growing tomatoes--an issue discussed in the next section.)
None of the farmers I interviewed kept close track of the total amount spent on labor for a given
crop. Most did, however, give a total figure of the amount "invested" in a particular field. To the extent
that such figures represented amounts which farmers had either borrowed, or taken in a lump sum from
savings or some other source of income, to finance the cost of producing tomatoes, they probably
understated the total cost of production. Thus, reported returns of up to 100% on amounts "invested" in
tomato fields were probably exaggerated. Nonetheless, it appears that, when market prices were
favorable, farmers derived a profit from growing tomatoes.
No one in Kumawu was overstating his or her tomato profits in June and July of 1994. Tomato
buying, like tomato growing, is privately organized: government neither controls prices nor subsidizes any
of the costs of marketing. During the harvest season, buyers, most of whom are women, travel daily
from Kumase or Accra, in small, covered vans (panel trucks), which ply the roads around Kumawu from
before dawn until 9:00 or 10:00 pm. Since tomatoes are perishable, they must be moved as quickly as
possible, and buyers from Kumase make several trips to Kumawu in a day. Farmers bring their tomatoes
to the nearest road, where they wait for the next buyer. Prices are negotiated on the spot: while farmers
continually exchange information about local negotiations, buyers who travel to and from one or more of
Ghana's large urban markets every day have better access to information about daily or even hourly
changes in price, and farmers often feel themselves to be at a disadvantage in the negotiating process.
Perhaps their greatest disadvantage, however, is their own success as growers. During my stay in
Kumawu, the price of tomatoes-which stood at ca $30 to $35 per box at the beginning of June, just before
the harvest began-fell to $1.50 a box in early July. At that price, farmers could not earn enough to pay
laborers to pick their tomatoes and carry them to the nearest road-let alone recover any of the money
they'd spent on labor or chemicals earlier in the growing season~and many left their tomatoes to rot in the
fields.
The collapse of farmgate prices in mid-1994 appears to have been exceptionally severe. In 1993,
for example, farmers reported having made modest profits at prices of $3-$6 per box. Nonetheless, it
underscores the fact that growing tomatoes is a risky business, as well as a highly commercialized one.
To the extent that economic liberalization eases access to markets and attracts more buyers and sellers, it
also increases people's exposure to market fluctuations. In this case, of course, the growth of small-scale
cultivation of tomatoes has also intensified competition and exacerbated seasonal fluctuations in price.
Under the circumstances, several farmers explained that, while they would like to expand their production
of tomatoes, they could not afford to do so. Instead, they tried to cope with the risks of growing tomatoes
by diversifying their crops and/or sources of income. Full time farmers invariably grew other crops, as
well as tomatoes, for sale and for home consumption. Cassava, maize and cocoyam were the most popular
staples, but most farmers also planted some yam, beans and other vegetables, and several women grew
onions as a commercial crop. In addition, many of the people who were growing tomatoes in 1994 were
not primarily engaged in farming at all. Among the tomato growers I met were traders, artisans, civil
servants, itinerant preachers, and a couple of aspiring musicians. All were well aware of the vagaries of
the market: they approached tomato cultivation as a kind of gamble—hoping to clear enough of a profit to
make a long deferred purchase or simply supplement their meager incomes from other sources, ready to
move to other ventures and/or locations if they failed.
To finance their "investment" in seed, chemicals and labor for growing tomatoes, most of the
farmers I spoke with in Kumawu needed access lo credit. Many of my informants said they had borrowed
the money from relatives or friends. The Kumawuman Rural Bank-part of a nationwide network of
community banks established under the aegis of structural adjustment, which are governed by local boards
of directors and required to operate without government subsidies-makes few loans to local fanners. In
the 1980s, as part of the government's program to revive exports, the Bank made loans to cocoa growers to
enable them to rehabilitate or replant old or neglected farms. At that time, Ghanaian farmers still sold
their cocoa through the Marketing Board, and Rural Banks counted the Board on to ensure that growers
repaid their loans. When a fanner delivered cocoa to an agent of the Marketing Board, s/he was not paid
directly, but instead received a receipt which was redeemable at the local Rural Bank. If a farmer had
borrowed money from the Bank, the amount of the loan could be deducted from the value of the crop, thus
guranteeing repayment. However, as the managing director of the Kumawuman Rural Bank explained
ruefully, "the farmers were very clever." Thus, a fanner who had borrowed money from the bank might
arrange to collect his/her receipts from the Marketing Board in the name of a friend or relative; then
report to the Bank that his/her crop had failed, leaving him/her unable to repay the loan.
Unable to prevent such practices, the Bank eventually stopped loaning money to cocoa growers at
all. In 1994. the only loans which the Bank admitted making to fanners'15 went to civil servants (whose
salaries are paid through the Bank, thus guaranteeing loan repayment) and members of a local Christian
sect, led by an ex-produce buyer, who had withdrawn from the town and set up a separate village on its
outskirts, where they practiced a strict communitarian life style. Known to themselves and other
Kumawufo.. as the Gyedifo.. (Believers), members of this sect enjoyed a widespread reputation as
successful farmers. Asked why the Bank had singled out the Gyedifo.. as worthy borrowers, the
Managing Director answered simply, "because they are organized."
By 1994, then, the Kumawuman Rural Bank did not appear to be playing a significant role in
making credit available for small-scale farming ventures. It had also scaled back its involvement in
large-scale farming, after its primary venture of the 1980s ran into difficulties. In the original scheme, a
Yugoslav firm entered into a partnership with the Ghanaian government and the Kumawu Traditional
Council to grow maize on the edge of the Affram Plains, about 35 km east of Kumawu. Known locally
by its acronym, KIFCOM, the scheme planned to cultivate maize on a very large scale, using advanced
mechanized technology. Each of the three partners contributed key inputs. The Kumawu Traditional
Council supplied the land—over 10,000 ha in a vast tranche of the Affram Plains which is claimed by the
stool of Kumawu; the Yugoslav company provided technical and managerial expertise; and the
government of Ghana helped to negotiate a loan from the Japanese government, through IFAD, for
infrastructure and equipment.
The scheme got off to a slow start. The Yugoslav firm built a dam and feeder road, but their
technical and managerial expertise proved poorly suited to local farming conditions. Reportedly, only ca
1500 of more than 10,000 ha allocated by the Traditional Council were under cultivation when the
scheme went bankrupt in 1992.46 At this point, the Yugoslavs went home, and the government decided to
convert KIFCOM to a cooperative for local farmers, under the joint management of the Rural Bank and
an Interim Management Committee of Kumawufo... Blocks of land were allocated to groups of farmers
who agreed to work them "cooperatively," and to individuals with the means to attempt large-scale
cultivation on their own. With the encouragement of the Kumawu Traditional Council, a few of its well-
to-do members went through the cumbersome and expensive process of taking out formal leases on tracts
of 100 ha or more, and several members of the Rural Bank's Board of Directors planted tomatoes.
The Bank, which was given responsibility for administering the Japanese loan, arranged to
purchase a couple of small tractors, equipped with hanows and carts. In the spirit of cost recovery urged
by proponents of structural adjustment, the Bank proposed to set up a tractor hire scheme, using the
proceeds to repay the loan and add to the Bank's revenues. But the Ministry of Agriculture objected that
this was inconsistent with their plan to turn KIFCOM into a cooperative farm, and proposed instead that
participating farmers purchase the equipment out of the joint proceeds of their crop sales, thus phasing out
the Rural Bank's role as financial intermediary. At the same time, however, the Ministry insisted that the
Bank was still responsible for the Japanese loan. The Bank's directors protested that they could hardly be
expected to guarantee the debts of an enterprise over which they had no control, and denied the Ministry's
claim. As a precautionary measure, they impounded the tractors and farm carts and locked them up in the
basement of the Bank's building in Kumawu. There matters stood in July 1994.
As these stories suggest, the course of structural adjustment has not run altogether smoothly in
Kumawu. Private production of agricultural commodities for the market certainly increased between the
mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, but efforts to reorganize rural credit supplies on commercial lines and
attract foreign investment to develop local agriculture were not very successful. For the Ministry of
Agriculture, the Rural Bank's inability to provide credit to more than a handful of local farmers or to
invest successfully in large-scale commercial farming called into question the competence of its directors.
For the Rural Bank, farmers' ability to evade repayment vitiated their efforts to underwrite the revival of
export crop production while operating on a commercial basis. Local attempts to attract foreign
investment also failed, bringing the government back in. The ensuing negotiations over the division of
assets and obligations between public and private institutions broke down over questions of accountability
and access. The whole saga raises questions about the feasibility and indeed the meaning of
privatization, to say nothing of its efficacy in promoting economic development. The questions multiply
when one turns from the subject of credit to the matter of farmers' access to land.
Land
In addition to new demands for credit, the spread of tomato cultivation has given rise to new land
tenure arrangements in Kumawu. About half the farmers I interviewed were growing tomatoes, as well as
other crops, on "family" or inherited land for which they paid nothing. However, many had also leased
plots of land for the express purpose of growing tomatoes."7 For the most part, such leases were short-
term and strictly commercial. A few farmers had arranged to lease plots for up to five years, but most
were renting fields for a year or a single cropping season of three or four months. Rents were usually
paid up front, in cash. The amounts were individually negotiated, and varied considerably from one
farmer to another. Those I interviewed reported paying anywhere from $5 to $20 per acre for a year or
less. I also talked with a few young men who said they had leased tomato fields from their relatives—
typically a "grandmother" or an aunt. Interviewed separately, the older women whom they named
confirmed that such transactions had taken place, but complained that "the children" had never actually
paid them any money and that they (the women) felt powerless to insist. For most fanners, however, the
practice of paying cash in advance to lease a tomato field was relatively unproblematic. Compared to the
cost of chemicals and labor, rent accounted for a modest portion of fanners' "investments" in tomato
cultivation, and most said that finding land to rent on these terms was "not difficult." More complicated
questions arose, however, over who was entitled to lease out tomato fields and collect the rent.
Land in Asante is not held as "private property"--subject to rights of exclusive ownership which
are vested in individual or corporate persons. Instead, most land is subject to multiple, overlapping
claims by several different kinds of social agents. In general, an individual may acquire the right to use a
piece of land by reaching an agreement with the "owners."48 As we've seen, many such agreements are
negotiated among members of one family. Families have established long-term rights to land in Kumawu
in a variety of ways (see below), and individual members may request to be allocated one or more parcels
of land by the family head (or elders), or by a parent or sibling from his/her own sub-allocation. Such
transfers of land rights among relatives are described as "gifts" (not to be confused with bequests). A
person who receives such a gift customarily acknowledges it with a small return gift usually of drinks or
money, known as aseda or "thanks." Made in the presence of witnesses, the payment of aseda serves to
confirm the gift, and witnesses' recollections may be invoked at any time to defend the rights of the
recipient against rival claims. Disputes over boundaries between family members' plots are common: they
may be resolved by family elders or, failing that, by elders of the stool. In a discussion of her role in
settling such disputes, the Queenmother (ohemaa) of Kumawu noted that intra-family boundaries are
rarely marked. "If your farm lies next to a stream, good for you!" In most cases, however, individuals'
claims stand or fall with the recollections, and reputations, of their witnesses. In practice, land rights are
subject to intermittent or on-going negotiation, and tenure security depends more on a person's standing
with his/her relatives and neighbors than on the way in which a claim was originally acquired.49
Many intrafamily transfers occur through inheritance. In Asante, descent is reckoned
matrilineally and, historically, inheritance followed lines of descent. When a person died, members of the
family met to select an heir. The heir inherited the deceased person's property which might include
"family property" which the decedent had inherited during his/her lifetime, as well as self-acquired
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property which s/he had not already given away. In the twentieth century, it has become common for
individuals to bequeath self-acquired property by means of written wills, though such bequests may be
challenged by the matrilineal family after a person dies. A common ground for such challenges is the
claim that property specified in the will was not self-acquired, but already belonged to the family. If the
claim can be sustained, it follows that the deceased person was not entitled to give or bequeath the
property in question.50
An heir is not supposed to treat inherited property as his/her personal possession, but to act as a
trustee, managing the property for the benefit of the family as a whole. (For this reason, the heir is chosen
after a person dies, by living members of the family whose interests s/he is supposed to protect) Of
course, heirs do not always discharge their responsibilities to the satisfaction of their relatives, nor do
family members necessarily agree as to which parts of a deceased person's estate were self-acquired. In
1985, the Rawlings regime enacted legislation which was designed to strengthen the inheritance rights of
spouses and children vis a vis those of the matrilineal kin.51 The law applies only to self-acquired
property, however, so that matrilineal inheritance remains very common. Disputes over inheritance have
been involved in a substantial proportion of land cases brought before the courts, as well as to extra-
judicial arenas of arbitration, both before and after the passage of PNDC Law 111.
Families may endow individual members with rights of usufruct, but neither the individual nor
his/her family owns the land outright. Except for land claimed directly by the government, ownership in
Asante is vested in the stools-chiefly offices, many of which trace their origins to the period before the
founding of the Asante state in 1700.52 (This statutory principle, which was formalized during the
colonial period, means that disputes over land often turn, at least in part, on competing interpretations of
Asante history. I will take up this issue in the following section.) Stools' rights take precedence over
family rights, although a chief who wishes to remain on the stool does not abrogate long-standing family
claims lightly.53 In principle, the stool must approve a family's allocation of use rights to non-family
members, and is entitled to receive something in recognition of its allodial rights. Portions of stool land
which are not claimed by a family (and/or its members) are under the direct control of the stool: the chief
may allocate or lease portions to particular individuals or groups, and expects to receive tribute from
anyone who derives something of value from such land. Amounts and forms of such tribute payments
vary widely depending, inter alia, on the value of the resources derived or produced on the land, and the
land user's relationship to the chief. Earlier in this century, the spread of cocoa as Asante's most
important commercial crop led to demands for substantial amounts of tribute, and helped convert relations
between chiefs and farmers who are not their subjects into those of landlord and tenant.
If land is commercially valuable, the chief will demand the going market price for allocating a
parcel of land, and will expect to receive an annual payment in addition. In urban areas, formal leases
for building plots specify both the duration of the lease and the annual groundrent due the stool. By law,
part of the groundrent must be remitted to the government to help defray the costs of land administration.
A file on each leased plot is also kept at the Lands Commission which is responsible for verifying that
there are no previous claims on a newly leased plot. Since the 1970s, the government of Ghana has
owned certain valuable, land-based resources-including mineral rights and any tree of a size and species
to qualify as marketable timber. In short, the government plays a key role in the disposition of rights to
urban and any other commercially valuable landed properties.
In recent years, formal leases have become increasingly common in rural areas, for building
plots and for land designated for commercial uses, such as large-scale fanning. A paramount stool, such
as Kurnawu, presides in turn over a hierarchy of sub-stools, some of which have rights over portions of the
land belonging to the paramount stool. In such cases, the sub-stool may receive a share of the allocation
fees and/or rents paid to the stool by lessees and other land users. Thus, for any given parcel of land, the
list of interested parties is likely to be long-especially if the land has, or is expected to develop,
commercial value-and there is ample room for debate over their respective claims. Adjudication of a land
dispute can take many years, and court judgments-while theoretically protected by the legal principle of
res judicata—are rarely final in practice.54
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Hearsay
In Kumawu, stools, families, and individuals have acquired claims to land in a variety of ways.
Many claims are based on past transactions, including not only formal leases and recent exchanges and
gifts, but also agreements made and battles fought by sometimes distant ancestors. (In principle, any
historical event which is held to have defined or influenced an individual's or family's relations to the
stool may be adduced to support or question claims to portions of stool land.) With a few exceptions, my
inquiries about families' histories elicited stories of ancestors who had migrated to Kumawu from other
parts of Asante~in several cases, before the founding of the Asante state in 1700-and were allocated land
by the Kumawuhene (or in some cases by another chief or family already settled there) for themselves,
their families and followers "to eat upon."55 Some also claimed to control hunting or fishing rights in
more distant portions of Kumawu land. The exceptions were several families who had migrated to Asante
from "the north"S6 during the colonial period, and one Kumawu chief, Nana Obiri Yeboah, who explained
that his forebears had descended from the sky to settle at Kumawu long before the founding of the Asante
state. Although he did not state explicitly that his ancestors were the first settlers at Kumawu, Nana Obiri
Yeboah's narrative clearly implied that his family had not received permission to settle there from anyone
else and, hence, did not need to consult anyone before allocating parts of their land. A few years before,
Nana Obiri Yeboah had provided the land on which the Gyedifo.. built their settlement; in 1994, many
members of that community were also leasing farm plots from him.
In the early part of the twentieth century, people who came from "the north" to settle at Kumawu
obtained long-term rights of usufruct from the stool on much the same basis as Asante migrants. Referred
to by other Kumawufo.. as "northerners" or "strangers", their descendants are visibly separated from the
rest of the townspeople by religion and dress (most are Muslims), and live in the zongo, a distinct quarter
within the town. However, when asked about their place of origin, most of the zongo residents I spoke to
said that they came "from Kumawu". In part, their insistence on claiming local origin may reflect the
lingering influence of an old stigma. Before the colonial era, many slaves in Asante came from the north.
To be of northern origin might, therefore, mean that a person was of slave descent and, as recently as the
1920s, public mention of a person's northern origin was considered an actionable offense.57
Criteria for determining "foreign"origin in Asante changed, however, under the combined
influence of cocoa and colonial rule. During the twentieth century it has become common, in both
popular and scholarly discourse, to refer to Asante as a nation and to date its founding from Osei Tutu's
war of independence against Denkyira in 1700.58 Whether the term accurately describes Asantes'
understanding of their collective identity before the mid-twentieth century is difficult to unravel from
historical sources, particularly those of twentieth century provenance. What is clear from the colonial
archives is that British administrators' interpretation of Asante nationhood changed during their tenure as
its rulers, as they attempted to sort out competing claims to land and office. In particular, the spread of
cocoa cultivation in Asante in the early twentieth century gave rise to intense struggles over the income
generated by production and sale of the crop. Following the lead of their counterparts in the Colony,59
chiefs in Asante began to demand tribute from farmers who were cultivating cocoa on their stool lands. la
adjudicating the ensuing disputes, colonial commissioners also cited practice in the Colony as precedent,
declaring that chiefs could collect cocoa tribute from "strangers" but not from"citizens'\ In keeping with
their own claim to rule Asante "by right of conquest",60 they assumed initially that Asante "citizenship"
applied to all native subjects of the conquered state.61 Asante chiefs objected vigorously, pointing out
that, in the Colony, a chief was allowed to collect tribute from any fanner who was not a subject of his
stool, and demanding equal treatment. Since their own authority rested heavily on incorporating Asante
chiefs into the apparatus of colonial administration, the commissioners conceded the point: by 1913, Chief
Commissioner Fuller had ruled that "'stranger' in this connection means anyone Ashanti or non-Ashanti,
not belonging to the particular Division or Clan, on whose territory he has made himself a Plantation."62
The definition remains in widespread use today.
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Under colonial rule, then, "citizenship" in Asante came to be defined in terms of political
allegiance—not to the colonial regime or its domain, the Protectorate of Asante, but to individual stools.
This practice distinguished Asante from other British colonies, such as Nigeria, where Africans were
identified for administrative and legal purposes by their places of origin. It helped to secure the place of
Asante chiefs in colonial society, and has lent a distinctive cast to the shape of "civil society" since Ghana
became independent of colonial rule. In Kumawu, the Traditional Council continues to insist on its right
to collect tribute from "strangers"—an important source of tension in current struggles over rights to land
in the Affram Plains.63 To date, the Council has not claimed the right to lease land for tomato cultivation,
but there is some evidence that individual chiefs may be starting to do so.64 More generally, the shifting,
sometimes contested meanings of '•citizen" and "stranger" in Asante illustrate the impracticality of trying
to understand contemporary property rights or state-society relations in terms of "communities11 and
"traditions" which have endured, unaltered, since precolonial times and only begun to "break down" in the
last ten or twenty years.
I referred earlier to the fact that throughout the twentieth century, and possibly before, disputes
over land in Asante have served as important sites for the (reproduction of history. Relevant historical
events may be of recent or ancient provenance. In addition to narratives of conquest, migration,
settlement and negotiation, many land claims are based, at least in part, on judicial precedent. During the
early years of the twentieth century, colonial administrators served as judges in Asante. In 1924, Native
Tribunals were established, where civil cases involving modest amounts of property were adjudicated by
Asante chiefs. The commissioners' courts continued, however, to hear capital cases and civil cases
involving substantial amounts of property, and they also served as courts of appeal for litigants who were
dissatisfied with the rulings of the Native Tribunals. In both commissioners' and customary courts,
records were kept of charges filed, judgments given, and (in increasing detail) litigants' and witnesses'
testimonies. In land disputes, the courts frequently demarcated boundaries between disputants, as well as
pronouncing on the validity of competing claims. As court judgments accumulated, they formed an
increasingly important body of evidence in subsequent land ligitation. In 1993,1 heard lawyers in the
Kumase High Courts argue, without irony, that scholarly works by non-Ghanaian authors could not be
considered reliable sources of evidence, while citing rulings by colonial officials as incontrovertible proof
of the validity of their clients' claims.
In short, much of the evidence adduced in land disputes consists of narratives of past events.
Information about geneaologies, migrations, wars, negotiations, contracts, and the results of previous
adjudication is regularly presented in court, by litigants, witnesses and lawyers.as evidence to substantiate
or challenge contemporary claims to land. Judges wrestle continually with problems of historical
interpretation, and base their rulings on a wide range of historical sources, many of them orally
transmitted. Whatever its status in written law, oral history is routinely presented in court, and carefully
weighed along with documentary evidence and eye-witness accounts. The ambiguities of this practice
were nicely expressed in an exchange which I observed in the High Court of Kumase in 1993. Counsel
for the defense was leading in evidence a witness whose testimony turned on a narrative of events which
occurred at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Attempting to discredit the testimony, counsel for the
plaintiff objected that the witness's evidence was "nothing but hearsay." "Of course," the judge replied,
leaning across the bench and speaking slowly for emphasis. "All traditional history is hearsay. But it is
permissible hearsay." And he ordered the witness to proceed with his story.
If claims to land rest on historical knowledge, how is such knowledge produced and distributed?
In Asante, negotiations or disputes over land are likely to involve many people who present different,
often conflicting, versions of historical knowledge to support their claims. The production (and
circulation) of knowledge in this context is competitive~but not perfectly so. Some witnesses carry more
weight than others, owing to differences in social position or reputation; some give more convincing
accounts. People may also influence the course of negotiations by limiting access to historical knowledge.
During my stay in Kumase, a case before the High Court was stalled for weeks after the judge, seeking to
clarify variations in witnesses' testimony concerning the movements of a shrine and its devotees in the
early eighteenth century, subpoenaed the Asantehene (or his acccredited representative) to provide the
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authoritative version in court. Each time a hearing was scheduled, a functionary from the palace appeared
before the bench, offered excuses, and requested another date. As I watched the same thing happen
repeatedly, my initial disappointment (at being denied the opportunity to hear what promised to be highly
significant testimony) gave way to a realization that, by refusing to testify, the Asantehene was, in effect,
shaping the outcome of the case. Even if the judge were finally to abandon the subpoena and issue a
decision without benefit of Otumfuo's testimony, the case could later be appealed, or new charges
brought, on the grounds that the court's judgment had been inadequately informed. By being withheld or
kept incomplete, the power of history was enhanced.65
History is more than a commodity
I have referred to the production of history, in the context of claims on land and chiefly office, as
imperfectly competitive, but metaphors of the market do not really do justice to the processes involved. It
is true that historical knowledge is supplied in response to claimants' demands and, as we have just seen,
that people sometimes hold their knowledge off the market in an effort to increase its value. But the
analogy will take us only so far. For one thing, the quantity of history is not finite: past events may be re-
presented and re-interpreted-orally, visually, tangibly or in writing-indefinitely. Even records which
are withheld-locked up or left unspoken-continue to influence claims of property and power, as people
speculate about their contents or propose alternatives.66 This is not to deny the many ways in which the
acts and perspectives of the powerless or disadvantaged may be silenced, by deliberate omission or
socially constructed practice, in all forms of historical production.67 But they are there to be rediscovered
and, like all historical accounts, reinterpreted. The supply of history is unlimited: parts of it maybe
silenced, but it is not scarce.
According to market theory, a commodity which is not scarce has no value. But history in
Asante is anything but worthless. In conversations about history, in Kumawu and elsewhere, I was struck
by the fact that people often referred to family history as "our secrets." Since such a statement was likely
to be followed by a detailed recital of information about the history of the speaker's family, the claim to
secrecy was evidently not meant to deny me or other listeners access to the speaker's knowledge. Rather, I
would argue, such assertions of secrecy served to remind the audience of power-both the speaker's power
to shape the narrative, and the power of the narrative itself to shape negotiations over claims to property
and influence. As a friend in Kumawu explained to me, family history is a secret "because it can affect
you."68
The metaphor of secrecy, applied to family history, suggests a way to understand the value of
history in the social economy of Asante in the twentieth century. Unlike the commodities (or "goods") of
neoclassical economics, history derives its value not from scarcity but from motion. To "affect" people-
to protect or enhance their claims to property, or shape their ability to influence others-history must be
heard and seen. The production of history is a performative as well as an archival process: its value
depends on having an audience. This helps to explain not only the rhetorical oxymoron of recitals of
family history advertised as "secrets",69 but also the High Court's receptiveness to "permissible hearsay."70
Like the payment of aseda to one who bestows a gift, narrations of history create witnesses, who may in
turn be called upon (or decide) to become narrators. By offering their recollections, or proposing their
own interpretations, witnesses become participants in the (reproduction, as well as the preservation, of
history.
The production of history in Asante is, then, a social process which invites participation and in
which historical narratives tend to proliferate over time, rather than converge toward a single, dominant
version. In this context, the value of history depends not on scarcity, but on the social dynamics of
production. This was illustrated for me when I asked Nana Obiri Yeboah to tell me about his family
history. On the appointed day, Nana assembled the elders of his stool and began by pouring libations and
offering prayers to his ancestors. He then launched into a vivid and detailed account, lasting for over an
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offering prayers to his ancestors. He then launched into a vivid and detailed account, lasting for over an
hour, of his forebears' descent from the sky and their subsequent activities in Kumawu. At the conclusion
of his narrative, the chief offered to show me the family's shrine, which marks the spot where their
ancestor first set foot in Kumawu. Together with the assembled family elders and a small accumulation of
onlookers, my assistant and I followed the chief to the shrine, which was located in the bush about a half
mile from town. Here Nana again offered libations and prayers, courteously including a prayer for the
success of my studies in Ghana and my safe return home. Our way to the shrine led past the village of
the Gyedifo..., Nana's tenants, many of whom exchanged greetings with the chief as we passed, and
witnessed our procession to and from a key icon of his ancestral rights in Kumawu.71
History in Kumawu serves not only to establish a person's claims on property and power, but also
to constitute or reaffirm relationships with other people whose actions or recollections may help in the
defense or exercise of such claims. The value of historical production depends, in turn, on participation.
Even for those who decide to withhold historical knowledge, temporarily or indefinitely, as the
Asantehene did from the High Court, the advantage of hoarding depends on the fact that people know it's
happening-that the knowledge exists and may someday be reproduced. Others, like Nana Obiri Yeboah,
choose to put history on display, not only relaying their knowledge to the curious foreigner, but also
dramatizing the act of narration for the benefit of a wider audience (in this case, his tenants) for whom the
history in question is of more than academic interest. Because they offer recurring opportunities to
(re)define and (re)affirm claims on people, property and power, such performances are of as well as about
the social and economic history of Asante. People do not participate in the production of history on equal
terms, but they do participate—and in doing so contribute both to the proliferation of historical knowledge
and to its continuing power.72
Their participation also runs directly counter to a central tenet of "privatization"-that the
establishment of exclusive, unambiguous rights to property requires bringing an end to the proliferation of
potential claims and the historical precedents on which they are based, in order to create "tenure security"
and promote more productive patterns of land use. In a recent article, Thomas Bassett argued that a
World Bank project to construct a map of rural landholdings in northern Cote d'lvoire from aerial
photographs (purportedly a "neutral" and "objective" exercise) actually distorted the realities of local land
tenure arrangements, by freezing boundaries between plots and arbitrarily ascribing all rights over them to
two people, an "owner" and a "user."73 The result of this effort to silence the present as well as the past
was to make tenure rights less secure, and to provoke conflict between those whose rights the Bank's map
recognized and those whose rights it ignored. Such counterproductive interventions are encouraged by
scholarship which refuses to acknowledge the processes of negotiation and contest that help to constitute
African political and economic realities, and clings to the colonial administrator's conviction that
ambiguity and indeterminacy are obstacles to progress.
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